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Abstract—We propose and study the cooperative MIMO ar-
chitecture to enable and to improve the secrecy transmissions
between clusters of mobile devices in the presence of an eaves-
dropper with certain location constraint. The cooperative MIMO
system in this paper (referred to as Reconfigurable Distributed
MIMO) is formed by temporarily activating clusters of nearby
trusted mobile devices, with each cluster being centrally coor-
dinated by its corresponding cluster head. We assume that the
transmitters apply a practical eigen-direction precoding scheme
to transmit the confidential signal and artificial noise, while the
eavesdropper can be located in multiple possible locations in the
proximity. We first obtain the expression of the secrecy rate,
where the required average mutual information between the
transmitters and the eavesdropper is characterized by closed-
form approximations. The proposed approximations are espe-
cially useful in the secrecy rate maximization, where the original
non-convex problem can be solved by the successive convex
approximations. Numerical results show that the secrecy rate can
be significantly improved by leveraging the location constraint
of the eavesdropper, compared to the existing result. We also
demonstrate that the secrecy rate can be further improved by
increasing the cluster size.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, cooperative MIMO, re-
configurable distributed MIMO, mobile networks, artificial noise
injection, random matrix theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL-LAYER security has recently attracted in-creasing attention in the field of wireless communications,
as it guarantees information security between the legitimate
entities even when the eavesdropper overhears the communi-
cations [1]. Unlike the conventional cryptographic methods,
the physical-layer security does not rely on key-based en-
cryption for the confidential message. Instead, the legitimate
transmitter utilizes the characteristics of the communication
channels to encode the information, so that the confidential
message is conveyed to the legitimate receiver, while the
information leakage to the eavesdropper is eliminated in
the information-theoretical sense [2]. Therefore, the physical-
layer security guarantees perfect information secrecy between
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legitimate transceivers and circumvents the challenges in the
conventional key-based encryption, such as key distribution
and management, which are especially critical in wireless
communication due to its broadcasting nature.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the legitimate trans-
mitter(s) and the legitimate receiver(s) as Alice and Bob,
respectively, and refer to the eavesdropper as Eve. Under the
secrecy constraint, the maximum information rate between
Alice and Bob is characterized by the “secrecy capacity.” As
shown in [2] and [3], the secrecy capacity is the difference
between the Shannon rates of two channels, the legitimate
channel between Alice and Bob and the eavesdropping channel
between Alice and Eve, under the condition that the mutual
information between Alice and Eve is zero.
Multi-antenna transceivers increase the spatial degrees of
freedom of the communication, which can be leveraged to
improve the secrecy rate [4]. When Alice has a single antenna
and Bob has multiple antennas, a.k.a. the Single-Input Multi-
Output (SIMO) system, the secrecy capacity and the outage
secrecy capacity were investigated in [5] and [6], while the
corresponding MISO case was studied in [7] and [8]. The
secrecy capacity of a special case of the MIMO wiretap chan-
nel was considered in [9], where Alice and Bob are equipped
with dual antennas, and Eve is equipped with a single antenna.
Recently, the physical-layer security has also been considered
for the Distributed-MIMO (D-MIMO) systems in [10]–[14],
where Alice has a distributed antenna array composed of
remote fixed antenna ports or base stations. Therein, the
distributed antenna elements are connected to the central base
station via tethered high-speed fiber links, which is relevant for
infrastructure D-MIMO systems. The D-MIMO configurations
further improve the secrecy capacity by leveraging the macro
diversity due to more diverse path losses and shadowing [14].
Unlike the infrastructure D-MIMO systems, the cooperative
MIMO architecture studied in this paper is based on forming
the distributed antenna arrays on-demand, where each array is
composed of a cluster of nearby legitimate mobile devices. The
cooperative MIMO improves the secrecy rate by leveraging the
benefits of distributed MIMO, while having the flexibility in
the topology and the size of the formed antenna arrays.
A. Related Works
Evaluating the secrecy capacity amounts to finding the
optimal transmitted signals of Alice, which maximizes the
difference between the mutual information of the legitimate
and the eavesdropping channels. In the MIMO wiretap chan-
nels, the problem becomes optimizing the input covariance
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matrix, which is a difficult non-convex problem. Previous
works showed that the design of the optimal input heavily
depends on the antenna configurations of the MIMO channels
and the amount of Channel State Information at Transmitter
(CSIT) available at Alice. In particular, when both Alice
and Eve are equipped with multiple antennas, Bob has a
single antenna, and Alice has CSITs of both channels, authors
in [15] show that the capacity-achieving transmitter scheme
is beamforming. The beamforming direction is chosen as
the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the maximum
generalized eigenvalue of the wiretap channel. When Bob
is also equipped with multiple antennas, the conditions of
a full rank and a rank deficient input covariance matrix are
proved in [16]. In [17] and [18], assuming general multi-
antenna wiretap channels, the input covariance matrices are
constructed via the generalized eigenvalue decompositions of
the main channel and the eavesdropping channel. The closed-
form expression of the optimal input is given in [19] when
the input covariance matrix is full rank, and is given in [20]
when it is either full rank or of rank-one.
In the context of secrecy communications, the eavesdropper
is usually passive and silent as to avoid being detected. There-
fore, it is more practical to assume only the statistical, rather
than the full knowledge, of the CSIT of the eavesdropping
channel [21]. Compared to the full CSIT counterpart, there are
much fewer results available for the secrecy capacity under the
statistical CSIT assumption. The optimal transmitter can be
only characterized for certain channel configurations. When
Alice has multiple antennas, and both Bob and Eve have
single receive antenna, [22] provides a sufficient condition
for the optimal input covariance matrix being rank-one. In
the same setting, authors in [23] derive the optimal input
covariance matrix, where the artificial noise is injected and
optimized. The optimal rank-one input covariance matrix has
been also identified in [24] when Eve is equipped with multiple
receive antennas, and an on-off power allocation scheme is
proposed in [25] to maximize the secrecy rate. When the
statistical CSITs of both channels are available and Bob
has more receive antennas compared to Eve, authors in [26]
show that the optimal input covariance matrix is an identity
matrix with uniform power allocation across the transmit
antennas. In [27], a random precoding is applied at Alice and
is compared with artificial noise injection scheme. However,
when the instantaneous CSIT of the legitimate channel and the
statistical CSIT of the eavesdropping channel are available,
the capacity-achieving transmitter design is still unknown for
generic antenna configurations.
Alternatively, the secrecy rate maximization, assuming sta-
tistical CSIT of the eavesdropping channel, has been pursued
by approximating the information rate between Alice and Eve,
which leads to a simplified optimization problem. In [28], the
average mutual information between Alice and Eve is upper-
bounded by a deterministic channel and the optimal precoding
has the same direction as the generalized eigenvector of the
approximate wiretap channels. In [29], the average mutual
information is lower-bounded with a simplified analytical
expression, and the upper bound of secrecy rate is obtained by
assuming linear precoding at the transmitter. By approximating
the average rate of Eve with its Taylor series expansion, the
non-convex secrecy rate maximization reduces to a sequence
of convex sub-problems [30]. However, the techniques used
in [28]–[30] are relevant to the MIMO channels with co-
located antenna arrays, and cannot be applied to the D-MIMO
(or RD-MIMO) channels, as we assumed in this paper.
Care must be taken in the secrecy rate optimization for
D-MIMO system as the topology of the spatially distributed
antennas needs to be incorporated into the optimization prob-
lem. Due to this additional technical complication, the ex-
isting works on the secrecy D-MIMO systems either assume
full CSIT of the eavesdropping channels [10]–[12] or adopt
simplified transmission methods with statistical CSIT. In [13],
assuming the linear Time-Reversal (TR) transmissions from
distributed antenna systems, the asymptotic secrecy rate is
obtained in the large and low SNR regimes, respectively.
In [14], assuming multiple distributed transmitters with a sub-
optimal diagonal precoding, the secrecy rate maximization is
asymptotically approximated as a max-min problem for the
number of antennas approaching infinity.
In [10]–[12], [14]–[20], [22]–[30], the investigation of the
secrecy wireless communications assumes a single eaves-
dropper’s location known to Alice. Alice optimizes the se-
crecy transmissions according to this prior knowledge, and
therefore, the resulting secrecy rate is only valid for the
presumed eavesdropper’s location. To relax this constraint,
authors in [31]–[34] assumed a noiseless eavesdropper with
artificial noise injected by the transmitter. This assumption
allows the eavesdropper to be anywhere around Alice and
the corresponding secrecy rate is valid regardless of the exact
location of Eve. However, in some communication scenarios,
the “anywhere Eve” is an overly conservative assumption that
leads to pessimistic estimation of the secrecy rate. Indeed, in
many practical situations, Eve cannot be located in certain
areas, thus allowing to implement a larger secrecy rate.
A relevant physical-layer security technique is based on the
cooperative communication networks, where a group of trusted
nodes are either used as relays or jammers, see e.g., [21]
and [35]. In particular, a cooperative relaying scheme is
proposed in [36] and [37] to improve the received SNR of the
legitimate receiver, where the relays are selected according to
the degree of social tie with the legitimate transmitter. Therein,
the SNR thresholds serve as the secrecy and reliability crite-
rions at the eavesdropper and at the receiver, respectively, and
the locations of the eavesdroppers are modeled as statistical
point processes.
B. Physical-Layer Security of Cooperative MIMO
In our recent work [38], we studied a mobile cooperative
MIMO architecture, which we refer to as the Reconfigurable
Distributed MIMO (RD-MIMO). Therein, a group of nearby
mobile nodes forms a node cluster to jointly transmit or receive
wireless signals. The cluster is coordinated by a head node and
the coordination signaling is exchanged within the cluster via
local wireless connections. When two clusters communicate
with each other, and the head node of each cluster jointly
encodes or decodes the communicated symbols, the distributed
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antenna arrays resemble the D-MIMO system. In this work,
we consider the physical-layer security of the communications
between such two clusters of legitimate nodes, each collec-
tively called Alice and Bob, respectively. The inter-cluster
transmissions are wiretapped by an eavesdropper, which may
be placed at a number of possible locations, including those
near the legitimate devices. The secrecy rate optimization
with regard to the multiple possible locations generalizes the
conventional framework that assumes a single eavesdropper’s
location. This is also useful to relax the “anywhere Eve”
assumption in [31]–[34], and the considered framework can
take into account practical constraints of the system topology
to improve the achievable secrecy rate. Namely, if there exists
an area around Alice guaranteed to be free of eavesdropper,
the secrecy rate can be optimized assuming that Eve is indeed
placed outside this eavesdropper-free region. For instance, it
could be assumed that Eve could not be located within a secure
military camp, allowing the devices within the camp to achieve
significantly larger secrecy rate.
The RD-MIMO framework improves the secrecy rate both
effectively and flexibly. On one hand, compared to the secured
transmissions between two single devices, the spatial degrees
of freedom of RD-MIMO are increased, which can be utilized
in designing the secrecy transmission. On the other hand,
the node cluster can be formed on-demand and the number
of nodes in the cluster can be determined according to the
performance requirement.
We summarize the contributions of the proposed secrecy
cooperative MIMO framework:
• We assume Eve may appear at a finite number of possible
locations. As the eavesdropper may keep silent, Alice
only has the statistical CSITs of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nels corresponding to each of the possible Eve’s locations.
This system model can be used to evaluate the achievable
secrecy rate of the cooperative MIMO, where the location
of Eve is loosely constrained without specifying a known
location1. For example, Eve may be separated from Alice
with a certain minimum distance.
• We consider eigen-direction precoding ([8]) to construct
the input covariance matrix, which reduces the origi-
nal problem to a lower dimensional power allocation
problem. Accordingly, we derive approximations for the
average rate between Alice and Eve as a function of the
power allocation vector. Numerical results show that the
proposed approximations are reasonably accurate and that
they provide over-estimates for the exact average rate
with a large probability. This is relevant in the context
of physical-layer security to fulfill the required secrecy
constraint. In addition, compared to the exact expression
of the average rate between Alice and Eve, the pro-
posed approximations are explicit functions of the power
allocation vector. This is a useful property to further
approximate the average rate, a concave function of the
1In order to fulfill certain location constraint, Eve should be located within
a continuous region or on a continuous contour. However, as will be shown
in Section IV, the region or the contour constraint can be well-approximated
by placing Eve on a sufficiently large number of discrete possible locations.
We will leave the study of a region-constrained Eve in future work.
power allocation vector, with a linear affine function,
which greatly simplifies the secrecy rate maximization.
• The non-convex secrecy rate maximization, assuming
a number of possible locations of Eve, is solved by
successive convex approximations [39]. It converts the
original problem into a sequence of convex sub-problems
using the affine approximations for the average rate be-
tween Alice and Eve. Each sub-problem can be efficiently
solved by standard convex optimization tools. Numerical
results show that the proposed optimization framework,
by incorporating the location constraint of Eve, can
eliminate the outage of transmissions and further improve
the achievable secrecy rate, as compared to the existing
result of the conservative “anywhere Eve” assumption. In
addition, the secrecy rate can be also improved by acti-
vating cooperative nodes having a more diverse channel
conditions due to distributed node placements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the signal model of cooperative MIMO wiretap
channels and outlines the eigen-direction precoding scheme.
In Section III, we derive approximations for the average rate
between Alice and Eve using the eigen-direction precoding.
Numerical results are illustrated to validate the accuracy
of the proposed approximations. In Section IV, we present
the secrecy rate maximization framework and the numerical
results. In Section V, we conclude the findings of this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a pair of legitimate transmit and receive nodes,
which are hereafter referred to as the transmit and receive
head nodes. Confidential information is transmitted between
the head nodes over the wireless channel and prone to be
eavesdropped on by a malicious listener, as shown in Fig. 1.
In the circular area centering at the transmit head node with
radius rT , we assume there is a cluster with K − 1 trusted
transmit nodes, and the transmit cluster is collectively referred
to as Alice. Similarly, in the circular area centering at the
receive head node with radius rR, there are N − 1 trusted
receive nodes, and the receive cluster is collectively referred to
as Bob. All the legitimate and trusted nodes are equipped with
a single antenna, while the malicious listener, Eve, is equipped
with an M -antenna array. Note that there are various ways to
identify trusted nodes near the head nodes. As an example,
the trusted nodes can be identified by the degree of social tie
with the cluster head nodes [36], [37]. In this work, we do not
elaborate on the node identification process, but we assume the
trusted nodes are given.
In typical communication systems, the eavesdropper re-
mains silent to avoid being detected by the legitimate nodes.
However, in certain scenarios, it is relevant to assume that
the position of the eavesdropper is constrained to possible
locations, and that the communication between the legitimate
nodes can be optimized according to the prior knowledge of
such possible locations. As an example, consider a commu-
nication system with a minimum distance dmin guaranteed
between the transmit head node and the eavesdropper. To
obtain a non-trivial lower bound on the achievable secrecy
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Fig. 1. Cooperative MIMO in presence of an eavesdropper. Possible locations
of Eve have a minimum distance dmin towards the head of Alice. The distance
between head nodes of Alice and Bob is dB .
rate, the transmitting scheme can be optimized by assuming
that the eavesdropper is located on a circle centered at the
transmit head node with radius dmin. When the transmitter
implements a code with data rate less or equal to the lower
bound of secrecy rate, the communications satisfy the secrecy
criterion, when the eavesdropper is anywhere outside the dmin-
radius circle2. Fig. 1 shows the possible locations of the
eavesdropper, evenly distributed on a circle. The use of sam-
pled discrete locations reduces the complexity of the secrecy
rate optimization. As shown in Section IV, the approximate
but highly likely lower bound of the secrecy rate can be
found by assuming 10 evenly distributed locations on the
circle. The minimum distance restriction is practical in many
communication scenarios. In addition to the military camp
example, other examples include cooperative transmissions
from within a residential house or from within a personal
vehicle, where multiple trusted communication devices belong
to a private person or persons with high degree of social
ties [37]. Without permission to physically enter the camp,
the house, or the vehicle, any eavesdropper has to be located
outside the perimeter of the premises, and therefore, a certain
minimum distance is guaranteed. Note that the following
discussions and the optimization framework in Section IV can
be also extended when the possible locations of Eve are placed
in an arbitrary area.
Using the RD-MIMO framework as discussed in [38], the K
transmit nodes form a cooperative transmit cluster, where the
head node is responsible for encoding the information symbols
into transmit signals, distributes the encoded signals to the
cluster nodes, and synchronizes the transmissions from the
cluster. Similarly, the N receive nodes form the cooperative
receive cluster, in which the receive head node collects the
received signals from its assisting nodes and jointly decodes
the receive symbols. We assume the node cooperation within
each cluster is performed over high-speed wireless connec-
tions, while the transmissions between clusters have much
lower rate due to more severe channel impairments. Therefore,
the inter-cluster transmissions are the bottleneck of the system,
and the channels between Alice and Bob resemble the D-
2The eavesdropping model can be viewed as a special case of the annulus
threat model as in [40].
MIMO channels. We focus on the physical layer security
of the inter-cluster communication, where the communication
between Alice and Bob in the presence of Eve is modeled
by the MIMO wiretap channel [20]. We assume the security
of the intra-cluster communication within Alice and Bob can
be guaranteed relatively easily, because the cluster nodes are
in close proximity, so the communication links have shorter
range and have higher channel capacity.
A. Signal Model
Given a vector x = [x1, . . . , xK ]T, where xk denotes
the transmit signal of the kth node at Alice, the vector
y = [y1, . . . , yN ]
T denotes the receive signals at Bob, and
zi = [zi,1, . . . , zi,M ]
T, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, denotes the receive signals
at Eve when Eve resides at the ith location:
y =
√
gB Hx + nB , (1)
zi =
√
gE Fix + nE , (2)
where L is the number of possible locations of Eve, yn and
zi,m are the receive signal of the nth node at Bob (1 ≤ n ≤ N )
and of the mth antenna at Eve (1 ≤ m ≤ M ), respectively.
The MIMO channel between Alice and Bob is denoted as H,
where the entry Hn,k is the channel coefficient between the
kth transmit node in Alice and the nth receive node in Bob.
The channel coefficient Hn,k is modeled as the complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance βn,k,
where βn,k is the normalized average channel gain given by:
βn,k =
PL(dn,k)
gB
=
(
dB
dn,k
)α
. (3)
Here, α(≥ 2) is the path-loss exponent, PL(d) = cpd−α is the
average channel gain between two nodes at a distance d, cp is
the path loss at the unit distance, and gB = PL(dB) denotes
the average gain between the head nodes of Alice and Bob.
The channel coefficients between Alice and Eve are denoted
as Fi = WiΣ
1/2
i , where the M ×K matrix Wi denotes the
fast fading coefficients, modeled by i.i.d. standard complex
Gaussian random variables. The K × K diagonal matrix
Σi = diag([σi,1, . . . , σi,K ]) denotes the average channel gains
between Alice and Eve with the kth diagonal entry σi,k being:
σi,k =
PL(di,k)
gE
=
(
dE
di,k
)α
, (4)
where di,k is the distance between the kth node of Alice
and the ith location of Eve, and gE = PL(dE) denotes
the average channel gain between the head node of Alice
and Eve. The additive noise nB at Bob and nE at Eve are
modeled as i.i.d. complex Gaussian vectors with power N0,
i.e., nB ∼ CN (0, N0IN ) and nE ∼ CN (0, N0IM ).
In this work, we adopt the following signal-level assump-
tions:
1) The channels H and Fi are frequency flat and follow the
block fading process, i.e., the entries of H and Fi vary
independently from one channel coherent time to another,
but remain constant for each coherent time.
2) The instantaneous CSI of H is known by the nodes
in Alice, Bob, and Eve. The instantaneous CSI Fi is
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only known by Eve, while the statistical CSIs of Fi,
i = 1, . . . , L, are available to Alice.
The statistical CSI of Fi relies on the distance-dependent
path loss and the number of available antennas at Eve, which is
acquired from prior knowledge. For example, there may exist a
maximum number of antenna Mmax that Eve can be equipped
with and a minimum distance dmin between the head node of
Alice and Eve. By setting M = Mmax and dE = dmin, a lower
bound of the secrecy rate can be determined. The achievable
secrecy rate and a practical precoding scheme are discussed
in the next subsection.
B. Secrecy Rate and Precoder Design
The considered wiretap channel model with multiple pos-
sible locations of Eve is equivalent to the compound wiretap
channel with the receiver CSI [41]. Denote the channel input
as X , the channel output at the legitimate receiver as Y , and
the output at the ith eavesdropper as Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ L. According
to [41, Prop. 6], the following secrecy rate R̂sec is achievable:
R̂sec = max
p(V,X )
[I(V;Y)− max
1≤i≤L
I(V;Zi)]+, (5)
where [x]+ = max(0, x), I(a; b) denotes the mutual informa-
tion between the random variables a and b, V is an auxiliary
random variable, and V → X → (Y,Zi), 1 ≤ i ≤ L, form
Markov chains. The outer maximization in (5) is optimized
over the joint distribution p(V,X ) of the random variables
V and X . Note that the secrecy rate (5) is derived in [41]
assuming various secrecy criterions, where each corresponding
secrecy outage probability decays exponentially to zero as the
length of codeword increases to infinity. Since the CSIs are
available to the receivers, the outputs of the compound channel
at the eavesdropper can be viewed as the tuples Zi = {zi,Fi}.
By using the chain rule of mutual information, we obtain:
I(V;Zi) = I(V; zi,Fi)
= I(V; zi|Fi) + I(V; Fi) = I(V; zi|Fi), (6)
where I(V; Fi) = 0 since the instantaneous channel is
unknown to the transmitter and therefore V and Fi are
independent. Similarly, I(V;Y) = I(V; y,H) by treating
Y = {y,H}.
The rate maximizing distribution p(V,X ) in (5) is still an
open problem for generic MIMO wiretap channel. To proceed,
we set V = x and assume Gaussian signaling at the transmitter,
i.e., x is a multivariate Gaussian vector. In order to obscure
the information reception at Eve, artificial noise is sent with
the information signal, and the transmitted symbol x is the
sum of the precoded information and the artificial noise, i.e.,
x =
√
P VsΨ
1/2
s s +
√
P VaΨ
1/2
a a, (7)
where P denotes the total maximum transmit power, s ∼
CN (0, IK) and a ∼ CN (0, IK) are the information signal
and the artificial noise, respectively. The non-negative diagonal
matrix Ψt = diag([ψt,1, . . . , ψt,K ]), t ∈ {s, a}, denotes the
power allocation of the information s or the artificial noise a,
where the kth diagonal element 0 ≤ ψt,k ≤ 1 is the fraction
of power allocated to the kth transmit symbol, and we have
the power constraint:
tr(Ψs + Ψa) ≤ 1. (8)
The precoding matrices Vs and Va map the symbols to
the transmit antennas. In particular, we consider the eigen-
direction precoding [8], where Vs = Va = V1 and the
columns of V1 are the right singular vectors of the main
channel H, i.e., H has the singular value decomposition
H = V0Λ
1/2V†1. Although the precoding structure (7) is
heuristic and is generally not optimal due to the choice of
Vs = Va = V1, it is a reasonable scheme and leads to
low-complexity transceiver design. First, we note that under
the same channel knowledge assumption, the eigen-direction
precoding achieves global optimal when Bob and Eve are
equipped with single antenna [22], and has been also adopted
in other multi-antenna communication systems such as in [31]
and [32]. Second, by multiplying the receive signal y with the
unitary matrix V†0, the received signals are decomposed into
orthogonal parallel data streams with amplitudes proportional
to λk, 1 ≤ k ≤ min(K,N), and therefore, simplifying the
receiver design.
Under the precoding scheme (7), I(x; y,H) and I(x; zi|Fi)
are given by the well-known mutual information of the Gaus-
sian MIMO channels [42] as:
I(x; y,H) = log
det(I + γBΛΨs + γBΛΨa)
det(I + γBΛΨa)
, (9)
I(x; zi|Fi) =
E
[
log
det(I + γEWiΣ
1
2
i V1(Ψs + Ψa)V
†
1Σ
1
2
i W
†
i )
det(I + γEWiΣ
1
2
i V1ΨaV
†
1Σ
1
2
i W
†
i )
]
, (10)
where γB = PgB/N0 and γE = PgE/N0. The expectation
in (10) is due to the definition of the conditional mutual
information, and is taken over the distribution of Fi. For the
ease of exposition, denote the vectors γs = [γs,1, . . . , γs,K ],
γa = [γa,1, . . . , γa,K ], where γs,k = γEψs,k and γa,k =
γEψa,k. Then, with I(x; y,H) and I(x; zi|Fi) given in (9)
and (10), a lower bound of the secrecy rate (5), is expressed
in terms of {γs,γa} as:
Rsec = max
γs,γa∈P
[Rs(γs,γa)]
+
, s.t.
K∑
i=1
(γs,i + γa,i) ≤ γE ,
(11)
where P denotes the set of K-dimensional non-negative real
vectors. The constraint of (11) is rewritten from (8) and
Rs(γs,γa) is given by:
Rs(γs,γa) = fB(γs + γa)− fB(γa)
− max
1≤i≤L
{fE,i(γs + γa; V1)− fE,i(γa; V1)} , (12)
where γs + γa is defined as the element-wise addition,
functions fB(γ) and fE,i(γ; V1) are:
fB(γ) = log det
(
I +
γB
γE
ΛΓ
)
, (13)
fE,i(γ; V1) = E
[
log det
(
I + WiΣ
1
2
i V1ΓV
†
1Σ
1
2
i W
†
i
)]
,
(14)
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and Γ = diag(γ). Note that fE,i(γ; V1) depends on the
channel H via the precoding matrix V1, which is fixed
under the expectation operation. In Section III, we will derive
approximations for fE,i(·) under different channel settings,
and in Section IV present an optimization framework to obtain
the optimal power allocation as to maximize Rsec in (11).
III. AVERAGE RATE OF EIGEN-DIRECTION PRECODING
In this section, we present analytical approximations for the
function fE,i(γ; V1), defined in (14). Compared to the exact
expression of fE,i(γ; V1), the proposed approximations are
explicit functions of the variable γ, which can be conveniently
used to deduce the corresponding linear affine approximations
of fE,i(γ; V1). As will be shown in Section IV, the affine
approximation of fE,i(γ; V1) is the key ingredient to convert
the non-convex problem (11) into a sequence of simple convex
sub-problems. Under some typical system settings of the coop-
erative MIMO, we also present examples of numerical results
to illustrate the approximation error incurred by using the
proposed approximations. For notational simplicity, whenever
it is clear from the context, we drop the dependency of the
location index i from fE,i(γ; V1) and its approximations.
A. Average Rate Between Alice and Eve
Given a certain power allocation γ and a precoding V1,
fE(γ; V1) in (14) has the same formulation as the correlated
Rayleigh MIMO channel with the transmitter-side correlation,
which is available in literature [43]. However, by using the
expression [43, Eq. (123)], fE(γ; V1) depends on the power
allocation γ via the eigenvalues of Σ1/2V1ΓV
†
1Σ
1/2, instead
of γ itself. As a result, it is inconvenient to use fE(γ; V1) in
the power optimization, as it incurs large computation com-
plexity required to solve the eigenvalue problems. In addition,
the implicit solution of the function fE(γ; V1) would prevent
further manipulations to simplify the secrecy rate optimization
procedures, such as those described in Section IV.
To address this issue, we propose approximations for
fE(γ; V1), which will directly depend on γ. Specifically,
consider the quantity f˜E(γ) constructed as follows:
f˜E(γ) = logE[det(I + WΣ1/2UΓU†Σ1/2W†)], (15)
where the expectation is taken over both W and the Haar
unitary matrix U ∈ UK . We denote UK as the unitary group
containing all K ×K unitary matrices [44]. Comparing (15)
with (14), we replace the fixed unitary matrix V1 with the
random unitary matrix U and apply the Jensen’s inequality
for the concave log(·) function. Intuitively, when the path-
loss matrix Σ is close to an identity matrix, the unitary
matrix V1 or U commutes with Σ and can be absorbed
into the unitary invariant matrix W. The quantity f˜E(γ) then
becomes the strict upper bound of fE(γ; V1). In addition,
under other typical settings of the cooperative MIMO systems,
we will also show that f˜E(γ) can, in fact, serve as an accurate
approximation for fE(γ; V1).
In the following, we will denote {Di,j}1≤i≤a,1≤j≤b as
a a × b matrix block. We denote ∆m(a) = det[aj−1i ] =∏
1≤j≤k≤m(ak − aj) as the Vandermonde determinant and
denote pFq
(
a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣x) as the generalized hypergeo-
metric function with p+q parameters [45, Eq. (9.14.1)]. When
|x| < 1, it admits the series representation:
pFq
(
a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
∣∣∣∣x) = ∞∑
n=0
(a1)n . . . (ap)n
(b1)n . . . (bq)n
xn
n!
, (16)
where (a)n = Γ(a + n)/Γ(a) is the Pochhammer symbol.
In the following propositions, without loss of generality, we
present the expressions of f˜E(γ) when γ1 ≥ · · · ≥ γK .
Indeed, from (15), it is easy to check f˜E(γ) is invariant
under any permutation of the elements of γ, since UΓU†
has the same distribution as UPΓP†U† for any permutation
matrix P. We recall {σk}1≤k≤K are the average channel gains
between Alice and Eve as defined in (4).
Proposition 1. If M ≥ K ≥ n, γ1 ≥ · · · ≥ γn > 0 and
γn+1 = · · · = γK = 0, then
f˜E(γ) =
K−1∑
j=K−n
log
Γ(K + 1− j)Γ(j + 1)Γ(M −K + 1)
Γ(K + 1)Γ(M −K + j + 1)
+ log
(
det[A]
∆K(σ)∆n(γ)
∏n
i=1 γ
K−n
i
)
, (17)
where the K ×K matrix A is given by
A=
 {σ
i−1
j }1≤i≤K−n,1≤j≤K{
2F0
(
M −K + 1,−K
−
∣∣∣∣−σjγi)} 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤K
 . (18)
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. If K > M ≥ n, γ1 ≥ · · · ≥ γn > 0 and
γn+1 = · · · = γK = 0, then
f˜E(γ) = log
det[B]∏ni=1 γn−Mi
∆n(γ)∆K(σ)
− n log Γ(K −M + 1)
+
K−1∑
j=K−n
log
Γ(K + 1− j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(M + 1)Γ(M −K + j + 1) , (19)
where the K ×K matrix B is given by
B=
 {σ
i−1
j }1≤i≤K−n,1≤j≤K{
σK−Mj 3F1
(
1, 1,−M
K −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−σjγi)} 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤K
. (20)
If K > n > M , then
f˜E(γ) = log
(−1)(K−M)(n−M) det[C]
∆n(γ)∆K(σ)
−M log Γ(M + 1)
+
n−1∑
j=n−M
log
Γ(n+ 1− j)Γ(K − n+ j + 1)
Γ(K −M + 1)Γ(M − n+ j + 1) , (21)
where the (K +n−M)× (K +n−M) matrix C is given by
(22) on top of the next page.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix B.
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C =
 {0}1≤i≤K−M,1≤j≤n−M {σi−1j }1≤i≤K−M,1≤j≤K{γj−1i }1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n−M {γn−Mi σK−Mj 3F1( 1, 1,−MK −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−σjγi)}
1≤i≤n,1≤j≤K
 . (22)
According to the definition (16), the generalized hypergeo-
metric functions in (18), (20), and (22) reduce to finite series
summations given as:
2F0
(
M −K + 1,−K
−
∣∣∣∣−x)
=
K∑
l=0
Γ(M −K + l + 1)Γ(K + 1)xl
Γ(M −K + 1)Γ(K + 1− l)Γ(l + 1) ,
3F1
(
1, 1,−M
K −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−x)
=
M∑
l=0
Γ(l + 1)Γ(M + 1)Γ(K −M + 1)xl
Γ(K −M + l + 1)Γ(M + 1− l) .
The Propositions 1 and 2 can be used to compute f˜E(γ) when
γ is rank deficient, i.e., n < K. The rank deficiency of γ may
be due to the power optimization process, when Alice does
not allocate power to certain eigen-channels, so as to reduce
the information rate towards Eve.
B. Examples of Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to validate
the approximate expressions derived in Propositions 1 and 2.
Note that in this section, we do not optimize the power
allocation; this is the subject of the next section. We denote
RE = fE(γs + γa; V1) − fE(γa; V1) as the information
rate between Alice and Eve, as per (12), and denote R˜E =
f˜E(γs + γa) − f˜E(γa) as the approximation of RE , where
f˜E(·) is calculated by (17) when K ≤M , and by (19) and (21)
when K > M . In specific, we illustrate the variation range of
RE in Fig. 2 (a) and (b) as the vertical bars, i.e., the length of
each bar is maxRE −minRE , where the variation of RE is
due to 104 samples of the precoding matrices V1, a.k.a., 104
samples of the main channel H. Recall that the information
rate RE is calculated by averaging the eavesdropping channel
coefficients W only, while the precoding V1 is fixed. The
values of RE is then compared with the corresponding R˜E .
In Fig. 2 (c) and (d), we plot the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the approximation error R˜E −RE , which
is induced by replacing the fixed V1 in RE with the random
Haar unitary matrix U in R˜E . When forming the cooperative
MIMO system, the transmit nodes are randomly distributed in
a circular area with the radius rT from 1 to 9 meters. The
distance between the transmit head node and Eve is set to
dE = 30 meters. The number of receive antennas at Eve
is assumed to be M = 2, 4, or 6, while the number of
transmitters at Alice is set to K = 2 or 6. For each K, the
power allocation vectors γs and γa are randomly chosen and
then fixed for random samples of the fast fading W.
When rT = 1, the transmit nodes are distributed within
a small area and their path losses towards Eve have similar
value. The corresponding CDF curves in Fig. 2 (c) and
(d) show that the approximation error R˜E − RE can be
bounded within 0.4 nats/s/Hz. As the cluster radius increases,
the transmit nodes are distributed in a larger area and the
values of the elements of Σ are more dispersive. When rT
increases to 9 meters, the approximation error can be up-
to 0.4 nats/s/Hz when there are 2 transmit nodes, and up-
to 0.7 nats/s/Hz when there are 6 transmit nodes. Overall,
the approximation R˜E of the rate RE is reasonably accurate,
especially when K and M are large. In all the considered
cases, the approximation R˜E over-estimates the corresponding
RE with a large probability, i.e., as seen in Fig. 2, the error
does not take negative values with appreciable probability.
Therefore, in the context of the physical-layer security, it
is relevant to use R˜E as an approximation of RE in (12)
as it yields the lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate.
Designing a system by using such a lower bound to configure
the information rate of the cooperative MIMO transmissions
would not violate the system’s secrecy requirements.
IV. TRANSMIT POWER OPTIMIZATION
A. Iterative Power Optimization
The secrecy rate maximization (11) is non-convex and
its global optimal solution is hard to obtain in general. To
address this issue, we propose to solve the problem (11)
via the successive convex approximations. Specifically, we
first approximate the optimizing function Rs(γs,γa) with
R˜s(γs,γa) by replacing fE(γ; V1) in (12) with its closed-
form approximations f˜E(γ) given in Propositions 1 and 2.
We further approximate the non-convex function R˜s(γs,γa)
with a concave function by taking the affine Taylor expansions
of the fB(·) and f˜E(·) components. That is, in a neighborhood
of γ(0)s ,γ
(0)
a ∈ P , R˜s(γs,γa) can be approximated as:
R˜s
(
γs,γa
∣∣∣γ(0)s ,γ(0)a )
= fB(γs + γa)− fB
(
γ(0)a
)
−∇B
(
γ(0)a
)T (
γa − γ(0)a
)
− max
1≤i≤L
{
f˜E,i
(
γ(0)s + γ
(0)
a
)
− f˜E,i
(
γ(0)a
)
+∇E,i
(
γ(0)s + γ
(0)
a
)T (
γs + γa − γ(0)s − γ(0)a
)
−∇E,i
(
γ(0)a
)T (
γa − γ(0)a
)}
, (23)
where ∇B(γ(0)) =
[
∂
∂γ1
fB(γ), . . . ,
∂
∂γK
fB(γ)
]T
γ=γ(0)
,
∇E,i(γ(0)) =
[
∂
∂γ1
f˜E,i(γ), . . . ,
∂
∂γK
f˜E,i(γ)
]T
γ=γ(0)
are the
gradients of fB(γ) and f˜E,i(γ) evaluated at γ(0). As the first
term of (23) is a concave function of {γs,γa} and the other
terms are linear, R˜s
(
γs,γa
∣∣∣γ(0)s ,γ(0)a ) is a concave function.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 8
Together with the linear constraint
∑K
i=1(γs,i + γa,i) ≤ γE in
(11), the maximization of the function R˜s
(
γs,γa
∣∣∣γ(0)s ,γ(0)a ),
in the neighborhood of {γ(0)s ,γ(0)a }, can be efficiently solved
by convex programming tools, such as CVX [46], [47].
Next, we derive the expressions of the gradients ∇B and
∇E,i, as needed in (23). Based on (13), the partial derivative
∂
∂γi
fB(γ) is given by:
∂
∂γi
fB(γ) =
γBλi
γE + γBλiγi
. (24)
Denote V(γ) = {γj−1i }1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n as the Vandermonde ma-
trix. When M ≥ K, f˜E,i(γ) is given by (17) and the derivative
∂
∂γi
f˜E,i(γ) can be obtained by the Jacobi’s formula [48] as:
∂
∂γi
f˜E,i(γ) = tr
(
A−1 ∂
∂γi
A
)
− tr
(
V(γ)−1
∂
∂γi
V(γ)
)
− K − n
γi
, (25)
where the partial derivative of a a × a matrix A(t)
with respect to the variable t is defined as ∂∂tA(t) ={
∂
∂tAi,j(t)
}
1≤i≤a,1≤j≤a. Inserting (18) into (25) and apply-
ing Laplace expansion of the determinants, we obtain:
∂
∂γi
f˜E,i(γ) = − 1
det[V(γ)]
n∑
j=1
(−1)i+jMVj,iγj−2i −
K − n
γi
+
K(M −K + 1)
det[A]
K∑
j=1
σjM
A
j,K−n+i
(−1)K−n+i+j
× 2F0
(
M −K + 2, 1−K
−
∣∣∣∣−σjγi) , (26)
where MAa,b and M
V
a,b are the (a, b) minors of the matrices A
and V(γ). In (26), we applied the differentiation formula [49,
Eq. (16.3.1)] for the generalized hypergeometric function.
Similarly, when K > M ≥ n, the derivative ∂∂γi f˜E,i(γ)
can be obtained by using (19) as:
∂
∂γi
f˜E,i(γ)
= tr
(
B−1 ∂
∂γi
B
)
− tr
(
V(γ)−1
∂
∂γi
V(γ)
)
− M − n
γi
= − 1
det[V(γ)]
n∑
j=1
(−1)i+jMVj,iγj−2i −
M − n
γi
+
M
(K −M + 1) det[B]
K∑
j=1
σK−M+1j M
B
j,K−n+i
(−1)K−n+i+j
× 3F1
(
2, 2, 1−M
K −M + 2
∣∣∣∣−σjγi) ,
When K > n > M , the derivative ∂∂γi f˜E,i(γ) is obtained by
using (21) and is shown on top of the next page.
Finally, following similar procedures as described in [50],
the non-convex secrecy rate maximization problem (11) can
be converted into a sequence of concave maximization sub-
problems. Specifically, selecting initial points γ(0)s ,γ
(0)
a ∈ P ,
the kth sub-problem is given as:{
γ(k)s ,γ
(k)
a
}
=arg max
γs,γa∈P
[
R˜s
(
γs,γa
∣∣∣γ(k−1)s ,γ(k−1)a )]+ ,
s.t.
K∑
i=1
(γs,i + γa,i) ≤ γE , (27)
where {γ(k)s ,γ(k)a } denotes the optimal solution of the kth
sub-problem. The initial signal power allocation γ(0)s is se-
lected as the solution of the water-filling algorithm, which
only maximizes the information rate between Alice and Bob,
i.e., γWF = arg max{fB(γ) : γ ∈ P,
∑K
i=1 γi ≤ γE}.
The initial power allocation of the artificial noise γ(0)a is
chosen as an all-zero vector. The iterative power optimization
procedure is summarized as Algorithm 1. As shown in line
5 of Algorithm 1, the algorithm terminates when the secrecy
rate improvement between consecutive sub-problems is less
than a threshold .
Consider the consecutive (k + 1)st and kth sub-problems,
where {γ(k+1)s ,γ(k+1)a }, {γ(k)s ,γ(k)a }, and {γ(k−1)s ,γ(k−1)a }
are all feasible solutions. Based on Algorithm 1, we
have the inequalities R˜s
(
γ
(k+1)
s ,γ
(k+1)
a
∣∣∣γ(k)s ,γ(k)a ) ≥
R˜s
(
γ
(k)
s ,γ
(k)
a
∣∣∣γ(k)s ,γ(k)a ) ≥ R˜s (γ(k)s ,γ(k)a ∣∣∣γ(k−1)s ,γ(k−1)a ),
which show that the optimal rates R˜s obtained in the sequence
of the sub-problems (27) is monotonically increasing. Since
the achievable secrecy rate is upper-bounded for a finite
transmission power, Algorithm 1 will converge to a fixed-point
solution. This establishes the convergence of the proposed
secrecy rate maximization algorithm. We will also confirm the
rate of convergence of Algorithm 1 with numerical results in
the next subsection.
B. Numerical Results
To illustrate the convergence of Algorithm 1,
we present the sequence of the optimized rates{
R˜s
(
γ
(k)
s ,γ
(k)
a
∣∣∣γ(k−1)s ,γ(k−1)a )}
k≥1
achieved in each
step of the iterative power optimizations. We consider two
cases of cooperative MIMO channels in presence of an
eavesdropper with multiple possible locations. In the first
case, we assume K = N = 2 legitimate transmit and receive
nodes, where the channel coefficients of the main channel
H1 are given as follows:
H1 =
[
1.97− 0.92i 0.98 + 0.47i
−0.63− 0.035i 0.019− 1.24i
]
. (28)
Algorithm 1 Iterative Power Optimization
1: initialize: k = 1,  > 0, γ(0)s = γWF, and γ
(0)
a = 0
2: repeat
3: Solve the sub-problem (27) with CVX and set the
output as
{
γ
(k)
s ,γ
(k)
a
}
;
4: k = k + 1;
5: until R˜s
(
γ
(k+1)
s ,γ
(k+1)
a
∣∣∣γ(k)s ,γ(k)a ) −
R˜s
(
γ
(k)
s ,γ
(k)
a
∣∣∣γ(k−1)s ,γ(k−1)a ) ≤ 
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∂
∂γi
f˜E,i(γ) = tr
(
C−1 ∂
∂γi
C
)
− tr
(
V(γ)−1
∂
∂γi
V(γ)
)
=
1
det[C]
n−M∑
j=1
(j − 1)MCj,K−M+i
(−1)K−M+i+j γ
j−2
i −
1
det[V(γ)]
n∑
j=1
(−1)i+jMVj,iγj−2i
+
n−M
det[C]
K∑
j=1
γn−M−1i σ
K−M
j M
C
n−M+j,K−M+i
(−1)K−2M+n+i+j 3F1
(
1, 1,−M
K −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−σjγi)
+
M
(K −M + 1) det[C]
K∑
j=1
γn−Mi σ
K−M+1
j M
C
n−M+j,K−M+i
(−1)K−2M+n+i+j 3F1
(
2, 2, 1−M
K −M + 2
∣∣∣∣−σjγi) .
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Fig. 2. Comparisons between RE and R˜E . The distance between the head of Alice and Eve is dE = 30 meters and the radius of Alice is from rT = 1 to
9 meters. The locations of the transmit nodes and the power allocation vectors γs and γa are random generated. Vertical bars in (a) and (b) denote the range
of RE due to different precoding matrix V1. R˜E and range of RE with K = 2 in (a) and with K = 6 in (b); CDFs of approximation error R˜E − RE
with K = 2 in (c) and with K = 6 in (d).
In the second case, we assume K = N = 3 with the channel
coefficients given as:
H2 =
−1.06− 1.65i 3.01 + 0.11i −0.08− 0.60i0.09 + 0.72i −0.72− 0.59i −1.81 + 0.46i
0.53− 0.66i 0.17 + 0.28i −0.35 + 0.59i
.
(29)
In both cases, the eavesdropper is equipped with 2 receive
antennas and can appear at either L = 10 or at 20 possible
locations, which are evenly distributed on a circle with equal
distance dE = 30 meters towards the transmit head node. In
Fig. 3, the secrecy rate obtained in each iteration of the power
optimization is plotted for the cooperative MIMO channels
H1 and H2. As a comparison, the optimal achievable secrecy
rates are also obtained by exhaustive search over the space
of the power allocation vectors. As shown in the Fig. 3, over
the channels H1 and H2, the secrecy rate converges fast to
the corresponding optimal values in about 4 iterations. In
both cases, the secrecy rates monotonically increase, which
is in line with our prediction in Section IV-A. In addition, we
also observe that a larger number of Eve’s locations does not
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the secrecy rate for the iterative power optimization
Algorithm 1. The sample channels between the legitimate nodes are chosen
as H1 in (28) and H2 in (29).
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Fig. 4. Number of iterations of Algorithm 1 with stopping criterion  = 0.1.
change the resulting optimal secrecy rate. Therefore, we fix
L = 10 in the following numerical evaluations.
In Fig. 4, the required number of iterations of Algorithm 1
is plotted for the cooperative MIMO system with K = N =
2 or K = N = 4 transmit and receive nodes, distributed
within their corresponding clusters with radius 5 meters. The
number of antennas at Eve is set to M = 2. The distance
between head nodes dB and the distance dE are set to 30
meters. We evaluate Algorithm 1 for 50 random samples of
the legitimate channel H and set the stopping criterion of the
algorithm as  = 0.1. When K = N = 2, the maximum
number of iteration of Algorithm 1 is 10, and for most cases,
Algorithm 1 converges within 7 iterations. When K = N = 4,
only 2 or 3 iterations are needed for most of the cases. Note
that in each iteration, a simple convex sub-problem is solved
and therefore, Algorithm 1 has low computational complexity.
These results demonstrate the practicality of our approach.
Next, we investigate the secrecy rate when the cluster heads
can flexibly determine the number of cooperative nodes, which
are located within a given cluster radius. We assume that there
always exists sufficiently many assisting nodes to meet the
head node request. The number of legitimate nodes in each
cluster is allowed to vary from 1 to 5, while the number
of antennas at Eve is fixed to 2. The distance between the
legitimate head nodes is set to dB = 30 meters and the
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate Rsec with equal number of legitimate nodes in transmit
and receive clusters, where M = 2, dB = 30 meters, and dE = 20 or 40
meters. Solid lines: secrecy rate with cluster radius 8 meters; dashed lines:
secrecy rate with cluster radius 4 meters.
cooperative nodes are distributed in the corresponding clusters
with radius 4 or 8 meters. We assume that the eavesdropper-
free region is centered at the transmit head node with radius
of either dE = 20 or 40 meters. As a comparison, we also plot
the achievable secrecy rate obtained in [34], where Eve could
be located anywhere in the network. In this case, Fig. 5 shows
that the achievable secrecy rate of [34] is zero for K ≤ M ,
and then increases along with K for K > M . When there
exists an eavesdropper-free region with a radius 20 meters, the
secrecy rate is significantly improved for K > M , with 2.4 to
3.8 nats/s/Hz improvement as compared to the corresponding
“anywhere Eve” case. When the radius of the eavesdropper-
free region increases to 40 meters, the secrecy rate becomes
linearly proportional to the number of transmitters for the
whole range of K. In other words, by leveraging the location
constraint, the outage can be eliminated, and the secrecy rate
can be efficiently improved with more nodes joining in the
cooperative clusters. Fig. 5 also shows that the secrecy rate
can be also improved by increasing the cluster radius. Note
that when K = N = 1, only the transmit and the receive
head nodes are activated, which becomes the conventional
non-cooperative system. Results show that no reliable secrecy
communication is possible for dE = 20, while only a marginal
secrecy rate is achieved for dE = 40.
Next, we study in more details the impacts of the cluster
radius on the secrecy rate of the cooperative MIMO. The
secrecy rate is evaluated when K legitimate transmit nodes and
N legitimate receive nodes are distributed in the corresponding
cluster areas with the cluster radius ranging from 1 to 10
meters, where we set K = 4 and N = 4 or 6. The distance
between the head nodes of Alice and Bob is set to dB = 30
meters. In Fig. 6 (a), the number of antennas at Eve is
M = 2, less than both K and N , where we also plot the
non-zero secrecy rate achieved in [34]. In these settings, it
is observed that a significant secrecy rate can be achieved
even when dE < dB . This secrecy rate is achieved due to
the degree-of-freedom advantage of the legitimate nodes as
opposed to the eavesdropper. As the cluster radius increases,
the legitimate nodes are distributed more dispersively within
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their corresponding clusters and, thus, can reduce the distance
between some of the legitimate transmitters and receivers.
Therefore, the secrecy rate improves as the cluster radius
increases, which is also visible for dE = 30 meters. It is noted
that although Bob with N = 6 receive nodes achieves higher
secrecy rate, as the radius increases, the rate improvement
due to the radius of clusters is less significant compared to
the case N = 4. It is because the additional receive nodes
are located further from Alice (e.g., the rightmost node of
Bob in Fig. 1). Increasing the cluster radius also increases the
distance between these nodes and the nodes in Alice, which
results in smaller secrecy rate improvement. In Fig. 6 (b), we
compare the achievable secrecy rate when Eve has equal or
more antennas compared to the number of legitimate nodes
at Alice and Bob. Specifically, we assume M = 6 antenna
elements at Eve, while the distance between Alice and Eve is
dE = 30 or 35 meters. In these settings, when the distances dB
and dE are equal and N = 4 (i.e., the legitimate receiver has
inferior capability in terms of the number of antennas), only
marginal secrecy rate can be obtained when the cluster radius
is small. By increasing the cluster radius, the secrecy rate is
improved, almost linearly proportional to the cluster radius.
In addition, the secrecy rate can be improved more effectively
for dE = 35 meters, i.e., when the legitimate receiver has
distance advantage. As a comparison, by increasing both the
cluster radius and the number of nodes at Bob, the secrecy
rates can be improved by 1 nats/s/Hz for dE = 30 and by 2
nats/s/Hz for dE = 35.
V. CONCLUSION
As the small footprint mobile devices can be equipped only
with limited number of antenna, the secrecy communications
between such devices is difficult to realize when the eaves-
dropper has more antennas or experiences superior channel
conditions. The proposed secrecy cooperative MIMO (i.e.,
Reconfigurable Distributed MIMO) architecture addresses this
issue by temporally activating nearby trusted mobile devices
to form cooperative cluster and jointly transmit or receive
confidential message, where the communications between
clusters resemble a distributed MIMO system. The secrecy
cooperative MIMO architecture aims to enable and improve
the secrecy transmissions, by activating a sufficiently large
number of trusted devices, allowing to leverage the diverse
channel conditions.
In this paper, the eigen-direction precoding is applied to
construct the combined signal and artificial noise and the
corresponding secrecy rate is obtained, when the eavesdropper
may be located at arbitrary number of possible representative
locations. By using Random Matrix Theory, we obtain ac-
curate approximation for the average rate between Alice and
Eve. The proposed approximations enable the affine represen-
tations of the information rate between Alice and Eve. By
using the affine representations, the non-convex secrecy rate
optimization for multiple possible locations of Eve is solved
by successive convex approximations, which can be efficiently
computed by standard convex optimization tools. Results
show that the achievable secrecy rate can be improved quite
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate Rsec with K = 4 and N = 4 or 6, with distance
between head nodes of Alice and Bob being dB = 30 meters. The number
of antennas at Eve is M = 2 in (a) and M = 6 in (b). In (a), the distance
between Alice and Eve dE = 10 or 30 meters, while in (b) dE = 30 or 35
meters.
significantly by leveraging the location constraint of Eve. The
secrecy rate can be further improved by enabling additional
trusted devices, especially when the devices are distributed
more dispersively in each cooperative cluster, i.e., when Alice
and/or Bob outperform Eve in terms of the available spatial
degrees of freedom and the average transmission distance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 relies on the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1. (l’Hoˆpital’s rule [43]). Consider the ratio of
determinants of the form det[{fi(wj)}1≤i≤a,1≤j≤a]/∆a(w),
where w = [w1, . . . , wa]. As wb+1, . . . , wa (b ≤ a) approach
zero, the limit of the ratio is given by
lim
wb+1,...,wa→0
det[{fi(wj)}]
∆a(w)
=
det
[{
f
(j−1)
i (w)
∣∣∣w=0} 1≤i≤a
1≤j≤a−b
{fi(wj)}1≤i≤a
1≤j≤b
]
∆b(w)
∏b
i=1 w
a−b
i
∏a−b−1
j=1 j!
, (30)
where f (m)(w) denotes the mth derivative of f(w).
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Lemma 2. (Generalized Andre´ief integral [51]). Consider the
integral
J =
ˆ
CL
det
[ {ri,j}1≤i≤a,1≤j≤L+a
{Rj(wi)}1≤i≤L,1≤j≤L+a
]
× det
[ {si,j}1≤i≤b,1≤j≤L+b
{Sj(wi)}1≤i≤L,1≤j≤L+b
]
dw1 . . . dwL,
where the functions Rj(·) and Sj(·) are such that the integral
is convergent. Then, the following identity holds:
J = (−1)abL!
det
 {0}1≤i≤b1≤j≤a {si,j} 1≤i≤b1≤j≤L+b{rj,i}1≤i≤L+a
1≤j≤a
{´
CRi(w)Sj(w)dw
}
1≤i≤L+a
1≤j≤L+b
 . (31)
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Consider the
quantity
φ(s) = E
[
det
(
I + Σ1/2W†WΣ1/2UΓU†
)s]
. (32)
The matrix W is complex Gaussian distributed with the
density
f(W) = pi−MK exp
(−trWW†) . (33)
Inserting (33) into (32) and applying the change-of-variables
X = WΣ1/2, we obtain
φ(s) =´
UK
´
MM,Kdet
(
I + X†XUΓU†
)s
e−trX
†XΣ−1dXdU
det[Σ]M
´
MM,K exp (−trX†X) dX
, (34)
where MM,K denotes the space of M × K complex ma-
trices, dU denotes the normalized Haar measure on the
unitary group UK , and dX defines the measure dX =∏M
i=1
∏K
j=1<(Xi,j)=(Xi,j). The denominator of (34) nor-
malizes the right-hand-side of (34).
Next, we apply the eigenvalue decomposition X†X =
VΩV† with the Jacobian given by [52] as dX =
∆K(ω)
2
∏K
i=1 ω
M−K
i dωdV, where dω = dω1 . . . dωK and
dV is the normalized Haar measure. Then, φ(s) can be
rewritten as
´
[0,∞)K
∆K(ω)
2∏K
i=1 ω
K−M
i
´
UK e
−trVΩV†Σ−1I1(Ω,V)dVdω
det[Σ]M
´
[0,∞)K ∆K(ω)
2
∏K
i=1 ω
M−K
i exp(−ωi)dω
, (35)
where
I1(Ω,V) =
ˆ
UK
det
(
I + VΩV†UΓU†
)s
dU. (36)
We first solve the integral I1(Ω,V) by assuming all the
diagonal elements of Γ being non-zero, i.e., n = K. The
general result with 0 < n < K is obtained by taking the limit
γn+1, . . . , γK → 0. By using the integral identity [53, Eq.
(3.21)], I1(Ω,V) can be solved as
det[(1 + ωiγj)
s+K−1]
∆K(ω)∆K(γ)
K−1∏
j=0
Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(s+K)
, (37)
where the row index i and the column index j in the determi-
nant of (37) run from 1 to K. Using Lemma 1, I1(Ω,V) is
obtained, with M ≥ K ≥ n, by letting γn+1, . . . , γK → 0 as
I1(Ω,V) =
K−1∏
j=K−n
Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(s+K)
det
[{
ωj−1i
}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤K−n
{
(1 + ωiγj)
s+K−1}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤n
]
∆K(ω)∆n(γ)
∏n
i=1 γ
K−n
i
. (38)
Therefore, the integral I1(Ω,V) is independent of the matrix
V, i.e., I1(Ω) ≡ I1(Ω,V), which can be pulled out of the
integral over V ∈ UK in (35). The integration over V, denoted
as I2(Ω) =
´
UK exp(−trVΩV†Σ−1)dV, can be solved by
the Harish-Chandra-Itzykson-Zuber integral formula [54] as
follows
I2(Ω) = det[Σ]
K−1
∆K(ω)∆K(σ)
det
[
e
−ωiσj
]K−1∏
j=0
Γ(j + 1). (39)
Moreover, the denominator in (35) is a Selberg integral [55,
Eq. (17.6.5)] and solved as
ˆ
∆K(ω)
2∏K
i=1 ω
K−M
i e
ωi
dω =
K∏
i=1
Γ(j + 1)Γ(M −K + j). (40)
When K > M , (40) also holds by exchanging M and K.
Inserting (38)-(40) into (35), φ(s) can be derived as in (41)
on top of the next page, where the second equality is due
to Lemma 2. The integrals in the determinant of (41) can be
represented as the generalized hypergeometric function as
ˆ ∞
0
xM−K(1 + xγj)s+K−1e
− xσi dx =
Γ(M −K + 1)
σK−M−1i
× 2F0
(
M −K + 1, 1− s−K
−
∣∣∣∣−σiγj) .
By setting s = 1, and factoring out σM−K+1i Γ(M −K + j)
from the 1st to the (K−n)th columns, Γ(M−K+1)σM−K+1i
from the last n columns of the determinant on the right-hand-
side of (41), we obtain the desired result as in (17).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
By following the same procedures as in (32)-(35), we obtain
φ(s) as
´
[0,∞)M
∆K(ω)
2∏M
i=1 ω
M−K
i
´
UKe
−trVΩV†Σ−1I1(Ω,V)dVdω
det[Σ]M
´
[0,∞)M ∆K(ω)
2
∏M
i=1 ω
K−M
i exp(−ωi)dω
, (42)
where I1(Ω,V) is given in (36). When K > M , the
diagonal matrix Ω, containing the M non-zero eigenvalues
of the Hermitian matrix Σ1/2W†WΣ1/2, is of the form
Ω = diag([ω1, . . . , ωM , 0, . . . , 0]). Before applying Lemma 1
to (38) to set the corresponding ωM+1, . . . , ωK to zero, we
have to rewrite (1 + ωiγj)s+K−1 in (38) to guarantee the
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φ(s) =
1
K!
 K−1∏
j=K−n
Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(s+K)
 K∏
j=1
1
Γ(M −K + j)
 det[Σ]K−M−1
∆n(γ)∆K(σ)
∏n
i=1 γ
K−n
i
×
ˆ
[0,∞)K
K∏
i=1
ωM−Ki det
[ {
ωj−1i
}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤K−n
{
(1 + ωiγj)
s+K−1}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤n
]
det[e
−ωiσj ]dω
=
 K−1∏
j=K−n
Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(s+K)
 K∏
j=1
1
Γ(M −K + j)
 det[Σ]K−M−1
∆n(γ)∆K(σ)
∏n
i=1 γ
K−n
i
× det
[ {
σM−K+ji Γ(M −K + j)
}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤K−n
{´∞
0
xM−K(1 + xγj)s+K−1e
− xσi dx
}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤n
]
, (41)
convergence of the integral (42). By the generalized binomial
expansion, we have
(1 + ωiγj)
s+K−1 =
∞∑
l=0
Γ(s+K)(ωiγj)
l
Γ(s+K − l)Γ(l + 1) , (43)
where we assume |ωiγj | < 1 to guarantee the convergence.
We will later on extend this expression to arbitrary values of
ωiγj . Inserting (43) into (38), we obtain
I1(Ω,V) =
∏K−1
j=K−n Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
∆K(ω)∆n(γ)
× det

{
ωi−1j
}
1≤i≤K−n
1≤j≤K{∑∞
l=0
ωK−nj (ωjγi)
l
Γ(s+n−l)Γ(K−n+l+1)
}
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤K
 , (44)
where the first K − n summands in the infinite summa-
tions are cancelled as they are the linear combinations of
{ωi−1j }1≤i≤K−n,1≤j≤K . Then, we apply Lemma 1 to (44)
to take the limit ωM+1, . . . , ωK → 0. When K > M ≥ n, we
obtain
I1(Ω,V)=
K−1∏
j=K−n
Γ(s+K − j)Γ(j + 1)
Γ(s+M)Γ(K −M + 1)
∏n
j=1 γ
n−M
j
∆M (ω)∆n(γ)
×det

{
ωi−1j
}
1≤i≤M−n
1≤j≤M{
2F1
(
1, 1− s−M
K −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−ωjγi)} 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤M
 ,
and when K > n > M , we obtain
I1(Ω,V)=
∏n−1
j=n−M Γ(s+ n− j)Γ(j +K − n+ 1)
∆M (ω)∆n(γ)Γ(s+M)MΓ(K −M + 1)M
×det

{
γi−1j
}
1≤i≤n−M
1≤j≤n{
γn−Mj 2F1
(
1, 1− s−M
K −M + 1
∣∣∣∣−ωiγj)}1≤i≤M
1≤j≤n
 ,
where we replace the infinite summation with its correspond-
ing hypergeometric representation:
∞∑
l=0
xl
Γ(a− l)Γ(b+ l + 1)
=
1
Γ(a)Γ(b+ 1)
2F1
(
1, 1− a
b+ 1
∣∣∣∣−x) .
Note that the representation using the hypergeometric function
can be analytically continued to arbitrary values of x. Again,
we notice that the integral I1(Ω,V) ≡ I1(Ω) is independent
of the matrix V and can be pulled out of the integral over
V ∈ UK in (42).
When K > M , the integral I2(Ω) =´
UK exp
(−trVΩV†Σ−1) dV is obtained by applying
Lemma 1 to (39) when taking the limit ωM+1, . . . , ωK → 0.
That is,
I2(Ω)=
∏K−1
j=K−M Γ(j + 1) det[Σ]
K−1
∆M (ω)∆K(σ)
∏M
j=1 ω
K−M
i
×det
[ {
(−σi)1−j
}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤K−M
{
exp
(
−ωjσi
)}
1≤i≤K
1≤j≤M
]
.
The denominator of (42) is solved by (40) by interchanging
K and M . Then, after inserting I1(Ω) and I2(Ω) into (42), we
obtain φ(s) for K > M ≥ n as in (45) on top of the next page,
where the second equality is obtained by applying Lemma 2
and the identity [45, Eq. (7.811.1)]. When K > n > M , we
obtain φ(s) as in (46), where we applied Lemma 2 in the
second equality.
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